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Abstract 
 
The general goal of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) processes is to 
generate economic value through the coverage of firm business risk, on 
the one hand, and by exploiting the positive side of uncertainty 
conditions, on the other hand. 
The increasing attention attributed to ERM in the creation of 
economic value has led to even greater interactions between risk 
management mechanisms and the corporate governance system. 
In other words, in the last two decades, the relationships between 
corporate governance and ERM increased since the ERM processes have 
been considered more and more as critical drivers to combine strategic 
objectives with relative low volatility of company performance. The basic 
idea is that a good corporate governance system must deal about specific 
risks along with their interactions and, at the same time, the firm’s 
business risk as a whole. Moreover, an efficient and effective ERM 
system provides clear information about linkages between strategic 
opportunities and risk exposure and offers tools able to manage in an 
optimal way the negative side of  business risk (or downside risk) as well 
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as its positive side (or upside risk). 
Accordingly, extant studies concerning the relationships between 
ERM and corporate governance have been focusing on a micro-level of 
analyses (i.e., the individual organization) and, specifically, on a firm’s 
benefits that stem from the adoption of proper ERM processes that are 
consistent with corporate governance goals and are able to sustain the 
increase of economic value while maintaining a bearable business risk 
over time.  
From our initial analyses, a gap in literature arises. We argue that 
the interdependence between ERM and corporate governance may be 
analyzed from a broader point of view as well (i.e., the firm and its task 
environment composed by its suppliers, customers, and partners). In 
particular, our research idea is to enlarge traditional studies about 
interrelations between corporate governance and ERM taking into 
account whether such interrelations could be a driver of risk transfer 
from the focal organization to other organizations that belong to its task 
environment. Moreover, this study aims to deepen the mechanisms by 
which the transfer of risk from a focal organization to its task 
environment may foster the emergence of systemic risk, i.e., a macro risk 
coming from domino and/or network effects. 
Therefore, our paper aims to find new research areas by combining 
micro and macro issues tied to corporate governance, ERM and systemic 
risk.  
The starting point of our work is the three following assumptions: 
1) The compliance of a firm to ERM processes as well as to corporate 
governance rules implies the reduction as much as possible of firm 
business risk; 
2) The reduction of the firm business risk leads to externalizing the 
firm business risk through risk-sharing mechanisms; 
3) The risk-sharing may arise like a driver of systemic risk 
especially in those industries featured by strong network interrelations. 
Starting from the above assumptions, the paper goal is to open a 
new research area which combines four academic fields (ERM, corporate 
governance, corporate finance, and macro-finance). So far, our initial 
findings tell us that the following research questions arise: 
RQ1: What are the conditions under which the transfer of business 
risk towards organizations that belong to a firm task environment is 
likely to become a source of systemic risk in a specific industry? 
RQ2: How does the capital structure of a focal firm affect its 
propensity to transfer business risk not only to commercial but also to 
financial stakeholders included in firm task environment?  
RQ3: How does the transfer of business risk influence the capital 
cost of the focal firm as well as of the organizations that absorbed such 
risk? 
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